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Intuition suggests that firms with higher cash holdings are safer and should have lower credit spreads.
Yet empirically, the correlation between cash and spreads is robustly positive and higher for lower
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confirms these predictions, suggesting that precautionary savings are central to understanding the effects
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1. Introduction
A rm's holdings of liquid assets, such as cash, aects the probability of corporate default and
bankruptcy. This observation may in turn aect the rm's decision to retain a cash reserve that
could otherwise be invested or paid out to shareholders. Standard econometric techniques commonly
used in empirical studies of credit spreads and default probabilities ignore the interaction between
the possibility of default and the rm's optimal cash policy, and may produce counter-intuitive and
misleading results. This paper shows that the eect of cash holdings on credit risk is more subtle
than traditional studies have implicitly assumed, and highlights the importance of adopting the
corporate nance prospective of the rm in credit risk and other areas of asset pricing studies.
Since Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), a vast majority of theoretical models of
risky debt pricing have ignored the role of cash. According to the standard view of the levered
rm adopted by traditional \structural" models, should the rm nd itself in a temporary cash
shortage, it will always be able to avoid default by selling new equity at no cost, as long as the
share price remains positive. As a result, the rm's cash holdings are irrelevant in most prominent
credit risk models, including Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), Longsta and Schwartz (1995),
Leland and Toft (1996), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), and others.1 This view is mirrored in
empirical studies of credit spreads and corporate bond returns, which also do not consider the role
of cash holdings (e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Duee (1998), and Schaefer
and Strebulaev (2008)).
By contrast, since Altman's (1968) z-score model, most empirical default-predicting models have
used various controls for balance sheet liquidity (e.g., Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski (1984), Shumway
(2001), and Chava and Jarrow (2004)). Such studies select a set of accounting- or equity-based
variables, and, taking them as given, estimate logit or hazard models of default or bankruptcy.
With few exceptions, they typically control for corporate liquidity by using one or more liquidity
proxies on the right-hand side. The results regarding the role of liquidity in these studies are mixed
and often puzzling: For example, the coecient for the current ratio is positive in Zmijewski (1984)
and negative in Shumway (2001), whereas working capital is negative and signicant in Ohlson
1Prominent exceptions include recently developed models by Acharya, Huang, Subrahmanyam, and Sundaram
(2006), Anderson and Carverhill (2007), Gamba and Triantis (2008), Asvanunt, Broadie, and Sundaresan (2010), and
Gryglewicz (2011), which allow for optimal cash holdings in the presence of costly external nancing.
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(1980) but positive and signicant in Hillegeist et al. (2004). Yet such proxies continue to be used
in this way in default-predicting studies due to their intuitive appeal.
Liquidity is expected to play a role in distress because, contrary to the assumption of perfect
capital markets adopted by structural models, in reality rms' access to external nancing may
be restricted (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)). As a result of market frictions, cash
reserves aect the timing of default after controlling for the rm's economic prospects (Davydenko
(2010)). Ceteris paribus, rms with larger liquid asset reserves are expected to be safer and thus
have lower credit spreads and smaller default probabilities.
Yet the standard reduced-form empirical approach commonly used to study spreads and the
probability of default appears to lead to an opposite conclusion, that rms with larger liquid assets
exhibit higher degree of credit risk. OLS regressions of bond spreads for non-nancial rms reveal
that spreads are positively, not negatively, correlated with cash holdings. This result holds true
with and without controls for standard credit risk factors used in empirical studies, such as leverage,
volatility, and credit rating. The eect is robust, persistent, and signicant, both statistically and
economically. A one standard deviation increase in the cash-to-asset ratio is associated with a 20
basis point increase in credit spreads. Furthermore, intuition suggests that even if for most rms
default triggered by a cash shortage is a remote possibility, cash holdings should be relatively more
benecial for riskiest rms, for which such a possibility looms large. Hence, the correlation between
cash and spreads should be more negative for lower-rated rms. Yet once again this intuition appears
in conict with the data. Figure 1 shows the point estimate and the 95% condence interval for
the coecient for cash holdings (normalized by book assets) in a panel regression that controls for
leverage, asset volatility, rm size, debt maturity, and time eects.2 The spread-cash coecient
is positive for all ratings, and increases monotonically as the rating deteriorates. The correlation
between cash and spreads is almost 25 times as high for the lowest ratings (B{CCC) as for the
AAA{AA-rated bonds { and positive.
Similar relationships are found in predictive regressions of the long-term probability of default.
These tests are closely related to a series of classic empirical default-predicting models, including
Altman's (1968) Z-score, Ohlson's (1980) O-score, Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and
2Specically, this is the coecient for Cash/Assets obtained from regression (3) of Table 4, estimated separately
for dierent ratings. A detailed description of the data and the empirical methodology is provided in Section 4.
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Fig. 1. The correlation between credit spreads of cash holdings by rating. This graph shows the
point estimate and the 95% condence interval for the coecient for Cash/TA in regression (3) of Table 4,
estimated separately for each rating group.
many others. For illustration, we use the model suggested by Zmijewski (1984), although many
other specications work similarly. Zmijewski regresses the one-year probability of bankruptcy on
the current ratio (current assets over current liabilities), which is a commonly used measure of
liquidity, and two other accounting ratios. Surprisingly, he nds liquidity to be positively (albeit
insignicantly) associated with default in most subsamples. We re-estimate his model for prediction
horizons between one quarter and three years, and nd that the correlation of liquidity with default
depends on the horizon, as shown in Figure 2. The short-term probability of default is lower
when liquid asset reserves are high, consistent with intuition and the ndings of Davydenko (2010).
However, for horizons of one year and more, the correlation between cash and default reverses sign,
as in Zmijewski (1984), and soon becomes strongly statistically signicant { again with the wrong
sign.
The positive correlation between corporate liquidity and both credit spreads and the long-term
default probability is a robust phenomenon, observed for other data sets and time periods. Thus,
standard tests used in empirical studies of spreads and default probabilities seem to suggest that
higher liquidity results in higher credit risk.


































































Fig. 2. Liquid assets and the probability of default at dierent horizons. This graph shows the
point estimate and the 95% condence interval for the coecient for the current ratio QA/CL in regression
(2) of Table 6 for dierent prediction horizons. For a horizon of m quarters, the dependent variable equals
one if the rm defaults no more than in m quarters from the observation date.
How can these puzzling empirical ndings be reconciled with the simple economic intuition that
cash makes rms safer? We suggest an explanation based on the endogeneity of cash holdings.
Although endogeneity is recognized as a major issue in empirical corporate nance and many other
areas of economic research (Roberts and Whited (2011)), it has attracted less attention than it
warrants in credit risk studies and many other the elds of asset pricing.
We argue that the endogeneity of cash holdings is of rst-order importance for understanding
the role of cash in credit risk. In the presence of nancing constraints, riskier rms may choose to
maintain higher cash reserves as a buer against the possible cash ow shortfall. Such endogenous
adjustments in cash holdings can induce a spurious positive correlation between credit spreads and
cash holdings in equilibrium. This eect means that standard OLS and logit regressions common
in empirical credit risk research may yield misleading results. To show how a positive correlation
between cash and credit spreads can arise under endogenous cash policy, we rst construct a simple
model of cash in the presence of credit risk. We then present evidence that the positive correlation
between cash and spreads is spurious rather that causal, and that it is reversed when we control for
the endogeneity of cash holdings.
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Our model features a levered rm that can either invest its cash in a long-term project or retain
it as a cash buer against a possible shortfall that can occur when the rm's debt comes due. Future
cash ows cannot be pledged fully as collateral because of market frictions, and default is costly. In
this setting, higher investment implies higher cash ows in the future, provided the rm does not
default in the interim period. At the same time, higher cash reserves mean a lower probability of a
cash shortage when the debt payment is due.
An exogenous change in factors that aect rm's credit risk aect its credit spreads not only
directly but also indirectly as the rm adjusts its cash reserve in response. For example, if the
expected future cash ows decline exogenously, the probability of default rises, causing credit spreads
to increase. At the same time, the rm optimally increases its cash holdings, which reduces the
probability of a cash shortfall when the debt comes due, implying lower spreads. We show that the
direct eect dominates as long as constraints on external nancing are binding, so that riskier rms
have both higher optimal cash reserves and higher credit spreads, inducing a positive correlation
between the two, which we empirically nd is the case in the cross-section of rms.
However, \exogenous" variation in cash holdings unrelated to credit risk factors, for instance, due
to managerial self-interest, is negatively correlated with spreads, in line with the simple intuition.
Empirically, we nd that the correlation between cash and spreads turns negative when we use
instrument variations in cash by variables implied by the model (proxies for managerial self-interest
and rm's long-term investment opportunities).
The model also shows that the correlation between liquid assets and the probability of default
depends on the prediction horizon, consistent with Figure 2. Higher cash reserves reduce the prob-
ability of default in the short term, but may increase it over a longer period. This happens because
in order to save more cash the constrained rm reduces investment, which results in lower future
cash ows and a higher probability of a long-term cash ow shortfall. Empirically, we nd that for
prediction horizons of one year or more, which most researchers focus on, the positive correlation
between liquidity and default reverses sign in instrumental variable regressions.
The main implication of our results is that empirical studies of credit risk (and potentially other
areas of asset pricing) should devote more attention to the potential endogeneity of some of the
variables that are often taken as given. Otherwise, using some of the most common variables, such
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as corporate liquidity proxies, in some of the most standard tests, such as predictive regressions of
default, may yield grossly misleading results.
Theoretical and empirical research in corporate nance has focused increasingly on the fact
that corporate cash holdings are endogenously determined.3 The primary focus of this literature is
on nancial constraints, which create a precautionary motive for hoarding cash. However, extant
studies do not explicitly link cash holdings to credit risk or credit spreads. Moreover, empirical
corporate nance studies focusing on constraints and cash holdings classify rms as constrained
when they are small, do not have a credit rating, and have no access to the public bond market.
In contrast, our focus in this paper is on explaining the linkage between cash holdings and credit
risks for large rms with rated public bonds, which would be considered unconstrained according
to the standard corporate nance classication. Our model derives a relationship between cash
holdings and credit risk, holding constant the diculty of accessing external nance. The model
thus lends itself naturally to studying cross-sectional variations within rms that are publicly rated
but diering in their credit risk levels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes the data set. Section 4 studies the relationship between cash and credit spreads, and
Section 5 look at the role of liquidity in empirical default-predicting models. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs are provided in the Appendices.
2. The model
This section develops a simple stylized model of the rm's endogenous cash policy in the presence
of costly default and restricted access to outside nancing. Our main goal is to show that cash
holdings in equilibrium can be positively correlated with credit spreads and default risk, and to
disentangle the intuitive prediction that cash-rich rms should be `safer' from the confounding
eects of endogeneity.
3Studies of corporate cash holdings include, among others, Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Opler, Pinkowitz,
Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2008).
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2.1. Base case model setup
The model features a rm in a three-period investment economy. At date t = 0, the rm has access
to a long-term investment opportunity that yields a deterministic cash ow of f(I) at t = 2, where
I is the amount invested at time 0, and f(I) is a standard increasing concave production function.
In the interim period t = 1, the rm's existing capital stock yields a single random cash ow of
^  =  +  , where  is a known constant, and   is a zero-mean cash ow shock, unknown at t = 0.
The cash ow shock   is the only source of randomness in our model. The probability distribution
of   is described by the density function g( ), with the associated cumulative distribution function
denoted G( ) and the hazard rate h( ), dened as
h( ) =
g( )
1   G( )
: (1)
In what follows, we assume the hazard rate h( ) to be weakly monotonic.4
At t = 0, the rm has a cash endowment of c0, which can be fully or partially invested in the
long-term project, or retained within the rm as a buer carried over from date 0 to date 1 to meet
a future cash shortfall. We denote the investment amount as I and the cash buer as c, equal to
(c0  I). The shortfall in future can arise as the rm needs to make a debt repayment at date 1 and
has uncertain cash ows arriving at date 1 from assets in place. In particular, at t = 1, the rm
receives a random cash inow of ^  =  +   but owes a xed amount B in debt. In the model, debt
level is predetermined (a legacy of the past), whereas retained cash reserves can be chosen by the
rm at t = 0.5 We also assume that debt cannot be renegotiated due to high bargaining costs; for
example, it might be held by dispersed bondholders prone to co-ordination problems.
If the rm has insucient funds to repay the debt in full at t = 1, it defaults and is liquidated,
in which case future cash ows from the long-term investment, f(I), are lost. We model a nancing
4 This assumption is unrestrictive and often appears in economic applications, such as game theory and auctions
(e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 267)). Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show that the hazard rate is weakly
monotonic if function (1   G( )) is log-concave, which holds for uniform, normal, logistic, exponential, and many
other probability distributions.
5Although rms can choose not only cash holdings but also debt levels, observed variations in cash holdings are
much larger than those in leverage ratios. For the median non-nancial rm in Compustat with a non-trivial amount
of debt in the capital structure, the coecient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) for cash as a
proportion of total assets is 0.80, compared with 0.36 for total debt over total assets and only 0.27 for book equity
over total assets, with dierences signicant at the 1% level. Thus, cash policy is likely to be more easily adjusted
than debt levels. We therefore treat debt as exogenous in our analysis of the optimal cash policy.
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Fig. 3. Timeline of the model
friction at t = 1 by assuming that the rm can use only a fraction  of its future cash ows as
collateral for new nancing, where 0   < 1 and  = 0 corresponds to the case of extreme
nancing frictions, when the rm cannot raise any external nancing against its future cash ows.6
The rm's equityholders maximize the nal period return. The risk-free rate of interest is normalized
to zero, and in the base case, managers act in the best interest of shareholders. Figure 3 illustrates
the model's timeline.
The maximum amount of cash available for debt service at date 1 is c +  +   + f(I), which
is the sum of the cash reserve c, the random cash ow ^  =  +  , and the newly borrowed amount
f(I). The \default boundary," or the minimum cash ow shock that allows the rm to repay B in
full and avoid default, is:
 B = B   c0    + I   f(I): (2)
The total payo to equityholders is the sum of the initial cash endowment, the period 1 cash ow,
and the payo from long-term investment, less the invested amount and debt payment, provided




[ I + c0 +  +     B + f(I)]g( )d : (3)
Conditional on survival, raising new nancing at t = 1 in this setting is value neutral, so we assume
6 One economic interpretation of  is that it represents the extent to which future cash ows are veriable at date
1. Low values of  correspond to unveriable cash ows that are dicult to pledge as collateral to providers of outside
nance.
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without loss of generality that the rm always raises the maximum available amount, f(I). The




[(     B) + (1   )f(I)]g( )d ; (4)
where    B is the amount of cash left in the rm after B is repaid, and (1 )f(I) is shareholders'
claim on period 2 cash ow, conditional on the rm not defaulting in the interim.
In period 0, the rm's shareholders face the following trade-o in choosing whether to invest cash
or to retain it until the next period. On the one hand, higher retained cash holdings imply lower
investment, which results in lower cash ows generated by the long-term investment. On the other
hand, an increase in cash holdings reduces the probability of a cash shortage at date 1, increasing
the likelihood that the rm survives until date 2 to reap the benets of the long-term investment.
The market value of the rm's debt, D, is
D = B  
Z  B
 1
[B   (c + ^ )]g( )d ; (5)
which can be interpreted as the face value of debt B, adjusted for the loss that creditors expect to
incur in default states [ 1; B]. Note that creditors recover the amount (c + ^ ) in case of default.





In what follows, we study how changes in model parameters aect credit spreads and cash
holdings. The eect of any variable x on the credit spread can be decomposed into two components.
First, the spread may depend on x directly. Second, it may be aected indirectly if changes in x













It is easy to show that @s
@c < 0, which is the intuitive result that higher cash holdings result in lower
credit spreads provided everything else is held constant. At the same time, the direct eect of x on
9Cash Holdings and Credit Risk
the spread, @s
@x, and on cash holdings, dc
dx, depends on the nature of x. As the next subsection shows,
these two eects can work in opposite directions and yield a positive overall correlation between
credit spreads and cash.
2.2. Endogenous cash policy and credit risk
In this subsection, we show that variations in the rm's expected cash ow  may result in a positive
correlation between credit spreads and optimal cash holdings.
Let I denote the rm's optimal investment and c the optimally chosen cash reserve: c = c0 I.
Let s represent its credit spread in equilibrium, s = s(c). The following proposition summarizes
the eect of the expected interim cash ow  on equilibrium cash holdings, as well as its net eect
on the credit spread (see the Appendices for all proofs).
Proposition 1. If the hazard rate h() is non-decreasing, then
1. Equilibrium cash reserve c is a non-increasing function of  for any  < 1; and
2. There exists a threshold level of pledgeability  , such that the equilibrium credit spread s is
decreasing in  for any  <  .
The rst part of Proposition 1 states that if the hazard rate h() is non-decreasingand external
nancing is restricted ( < 1), then \riskier" rms with lower expected interim cash ow, which
face a higher risk of a cash ow shortage at the time when debt is due, optimally choose a higher
cash reserve. Empirical evidence in support of this prediction appears in Figure 4b, which shows
that for rms with low interest coverage ratios for which our eects are relevant, cash holdings are
decreasing with the size of the cash ow (scaled by debt service).
The second part of Proposition 1 states that despite their larger cash buer, rms with lower
expected cash ows have higher credit spreads, provided that restrictions on external nancing are
binding (that is, the pledgeability of assets is suciently low). Thus, the direct eect of the lower
cash ow is to increase spreads by more than the indirect eect decreases them through the rise
in precautionary savings. Formally, in Equation (7) with x = , we have @s
@ < 0 (other things
being equal, an increase in the cash ow reduces spreads), dc
d  0 (higher cash ow means lower
precautionary savings), and even though @s
@c < 0 (lower savings mean higher spreads), the rst eect
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dominates, so that ds
d < 0 (overall, spreads and cash ows are negatively correlated). Hence, both
the spread s and the cash reserve c increase when expected cash ows fall. In practice, this means
that when cash ow levels are allowed to vary over time or in the cross-section, this variation is
likely to induce a positive correlation between endogenously chosen cash reserves and credit spreads.
It should be noted that the same eect may arise due to variation in rm characteristics other
than cash ow, if they aect both spreads and optimal cash holdings. For example, consider vari-
ations in debt levels across rms. Suppose that the rm's debt level increases. The direct eect
of this increase is to raise spreads. However, at the same, time optimal cash holdings also rise,
which dampens the eect of higher debt levels on spreads. It can be shown that the direct eect
dominates, much as in the case of varying cash ows in Proposition 1. As a result, more indebted
rms have both higher cash levels and higher spreads, implying a positive cross-sectional correlation
between the two.
2.3. Exogenous variations in cash
In this subsection, we look at the eect of \exogenous" variations in cash, which are not induced
by variations in credit risk factors. Suppose that cash holdings also depend on a variable x that
does not aect spreads directly, so that in Equation (7), @s
@x = 0, implying that x can be correlated
with spreads only through its eect on cash. Then, variations in cash induced by variations in x
are negatively correlated with spreads. This dependence is consistent with the simple intuition that
rms with more cash should be \safer" and have lower credit spreads.
Proposition 2. If @s
@x = 0, the credit spread s is negatively related to variations in cash holdings
induced by changes in x.
What economic factors might aect cash holdings but not the value of debt, other than indi-
rectly through their eect on cash? As an illustration, we augment the model to allow managers'
optimally chosen cash holdings to depend on growth options (future investment opportunities) and
the structure of managerial compensation.7
Growth options: We model the rm's growth options as an investment opportunity that will be
open to the rm at the interim date t = 1 and will yield a cash ow at date 2. If this investment is
7Other examples include cash windfalls or losses unrelated to managers' cash policy decisions. For instance, the
rm may win a lawsuit, resulting in a cash inow from the defendant.
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not pledgeable at t = 1, then its presence does not aect the value of the debt that must be repaid
at date 1, other than through its eect on cash reserves. For simplicity, assume that these growth
options have a xed value of z > 0, independent of other rm characteristics. If the rm defaults on
its debt, this investment opportunity is lost, perhaps due to loss of customers, the inability to retain
management, or the non-transferability of human capital. Crucially, the growth option increases
the value of equity conditional on survival and hence enhances shareholders' incentive to conserve
cash to avoid default, but it does not benet short-term creditors directly.




[ I + c0 +  +     B + f(I) + z]g( )d  : (8)
We show in Appendix B that the presence of growth options decreases initial investment, because
the incentive to survive is now stronger. In particular, the total eect of the change in growth options
on credit spreads consists of only the indirect eect through the optimal cash balance. Hence, the
cross-sectional variation in optimal cash holdings induced by growth options should be negatively
correlated with credit spreads.
Managerial losses in distress: Default involves private costs for the management. Gilson (1989)
notes that such costs may arise because of the loss of future income, rm-specic human capital,
or non-pecuniary benets, such as power and prestige, and because of adverse reputation eects.
He nds empirically that the top management of distressed rms is almost three times as likely to
be replaced as that of non-distressed rms. Managers' private costs of distress likely depend on
the structure of their compensation contracts. Dierences in managerial compensation across rms
should thus result in dierent incentives for managers to avoid default, because the private costs
dier. That is, for managers of two rms with the same underlying credit risk, the precautionary
motive for saving cash may be weaker or stronger, depending on their compensation structure. In
this way, dierences in managerial compensation induce an exogenous variation in cash holdings.
Suppose that the rm's risk-neutral manager owns a share  > 0 of the equity E and incurs a
xed, private cost  > 0 if the rm defaults. For a given ownership level , the manager's incentive to
retain cash increases with the private cost of distress . Conversely, given , the manager's incentive
to hold cash declines with her ownership of the rm . The overall eect on the manager's chosen
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cash policy depends on the ratio of managerial cost to equity stake,

, which can be interpreted as
a measure of agency problems between the manager and equityholders. The higher the manager's
private cost of default and the lower her equity stake, the more conservative the rm's cash policy
(relative to one that maximizes the overall value of equity), resulting in lower credit spreads for the
same underlying level of credit risk. Formally, the manager's objective is to choose investment I to
maximize:
M =   E   G( B): (9)
We show in Appendix B this case is very similar to that of growth options, and the cross-sectional




2.4. Cash and the probability of default
Another important aspect of credit risk that we investigate is the correlation of cash with the
probability of default. We show that the correlation between the two depends on the horizon over
which we measure the likelihood of default. In choosing the optimal cash reserve, the rm's managers
trade o the reduction in the risk of default at date 1 (short-term eect) against investment returns
realized only at date 2 (long-term eect). We extend our model to show that higher cash reserves
reduce the likelihood of default in the short run, but smay increase it in the long run.
Consider a modication of our earlier setting, in which the rm's total debt consists of two
tranches of dierent maturities, so that part of the debt with a face value B1 is due at the interim
date 1, whereas that with a face value B2 = B  B1 is due at date 2. We assume for simplicity that
no part of investment return f(I) is pledgeable at date 1 (i.e.,  = 0), whereas it is fully pledgeable
at date 2. (Partial pledgeability in both periods does not aect our conclusions.) The threshold
level of date 1 cash ow shock, below which the rm cannot meet its payment at date 1, is given by
 B1 = B1   (c0 +    I), which is decreasing in the cash reserve c = c0   I.
Next, consider the risk of default at date 2. Suppose that the rm has not defaulted at date 1,
so that   >  B. Then, the rm's available resources for debt payment at date 2 are the surplus
cash reserve carried over from period 1, which is equal to  +   + c   B1, and the investment cash
ow f(I).8 Default occurs at date 2 whenever (+ +c B1)+f(I) < B2, which implies a default
8For simplicity, we assume that the rm carries its surplus cash reserve to date 2. In general, if B2 due is very high,
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boundary below which the rm defaults at date 2, expressed in terms of date 1 cash ow shock, as
 B2 =  B1 + B2   f(I). Because we assume that cash ows at date 2 are known with certainty, if
the rm survives at date 1 and its outstanding debt B2 is lower than the investment return f(I),
then its conditional likelihood of default at date 2 is zero. If B2 is higher than the investment return
f(I), there is a positive probability of default at date 2 as well. To avoid default in future, the rm's
remaining cash after date 1 debt repayment must be suciently high.9






  f0(I) = 1   f0(I): (10)
Because the probability of default in period 2 is increasing in  B2, this equation formalizes the
following trade-o: Higher cash reserves decrease the probability of default at date 1,
d B1
dI > 0.
However, since 1 f0(I) < 0 whenever there is a nancing friction, the probability of default in the
longer-term increases as the rm increases its cash reserve at the expense of long-term investment:
Proposition 3. An increase in cash balances reduces the likelihood of default at date 1 and
increases the likelihood of default at date 2.
3. Data description
In our empirical analysis, we use a sample of rms with observed bond spreads to study how liquid
asset holdings are related to spreads and the probability of default.
3.1. Data sources and sample composition
We study yield spreads on bonds included in the Merrill Lynch U.S. Investment Grade Index and
High Yield Master II Index between December 1996 and December 2003. The Merrill Lynch indices
include corporate bonds with a par amount of at least 100 million dollars and remaining maturity
of at least one year. The bond pricing database consists of monthly bid quotes from Merrill Lynch's
equityholders may have a strategic motive to pay out the cash reserves as dividends in earlier periods, as otherwise
all this cash would simply accrue to creditors (Acharya, Huang, Subrahmanyam, and Sundaram (2006)). We assume
that covenants restrict such strategic dividends, as is typically the case.
9Note that with complete revelation of information about the interim cash ow ^  at date 1, anticipated default
at date 2 should simply trigger default at date 1. However, a small amount of residual uncertainty, either in the
investment return f(I) or in an additional date 2 cash ow, would suce to avoid such an outcome.
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bond trading desks. We augment these data with descriptive bond information from the Fixed
Income Securities Database (FISD) provided by Mergent. We merge the data with quarterly Com-
pustat and CRSP, and also use expected default frequencies (EDFs) and estimates of the volatility
of assets supplied by Moody's/KMV. Also, we use the Default Research Service database from
Moody's to identify all public bond defaults in our sample, including missed payments, distressed
bond exchanges, and bankruptcy lings.
During the sample period, the two Merrill Lynch indices include 429,420 monthly corporate
bond quotes. We exclude observations that we cannot reliably merge with FISD and Compustat,
and in most of our tests, unless specically stated otherwise, we also exclude bonds issued by
nancial companies (SIC codes 6000{6999). We eliminate non-xed coupon bonds; asset-backed
issues; bonds with embedded optionalities, such as callable, puttable, exchangeable, and convertible
securities; and bonds with sinking fund provisions. Finally, we exclude bonds with remaining time
to maturity of less than one year or more than thirty years, because the data on the risk-free rate
that we use to estimate spreads are not available for these maturities. The nal sample includes
82,676 bond spreads for 485 dierent rms.
Table 1 shows the composition of our sample by rating and by industry. Most of our regressions
include one rm observation per month; we have 24,496 such observations. Three quarters of
the sample are concentrated in the two lowest investment-grade categories, A and BBB. Junk
rms (those rated BB and lower) represent 16.4% of the sample. This composition is similar to
that documented in other corporate bond and credit default swap data sets (e.g., Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008)).10
Panel B of Table 1 shows the composition of the sample by industry. The highest proportion of
rms are in manufacturing, followed by utilities and transportation, and then consumer goods.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
10The number of rms in each rating class does not stay constant throughout the sample period, because ratings
can change over time. Statistics reported in the rst column of Table 1 show ratings for the 485 rms as of the date
when they rst appear in the sample. During our sample period, more rms were downgraded than upgraded. As a
result, for junk ratings, the proportion of rm-months in the sample is higher than the proportion of junk rms rms
in the second column of the table.
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3.2. Statistics on spreads and liquidity ratios
We measure the credit spread as the dierence between the bond's promised yield implied by its
price, and the yield on a portfolio of risk-free zero-coupon securities (STRIPS) with the same
promised cash ow, as suggested by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007). This estimation method
controls accurately for the shape of the term structure. Our initial data set is an unbalanced panel of
monthly observations of spreads. A potential issue with this data structure is that large rms with
many outstanding bonds may be overrepresented in any given month. Because we are interested
in the relationship between credit risk and liquid assets, which are rm{ rather than bond-specic,
using all bond-month observations may bias the results toward large rms. We address this issue
by computing the average spreads across bonds for a given rm in a given month, and using one
observation per rm-month in our analysis. We also use the average bond maturity of all bonds for
which spreads are available; all other variables in our tests are measured at the rm level.
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the spreads. The mean spread in the sample
is 192 basis points, and the median is 135 basis points. Unsurprisingly, spreads are higher for lower-
rated bonds. Untabulated comparisons of bonds with dierent maturities suggest that for a given
rating, spreads typically increase in maturity. It is interesting to note that the average BB spread
(372 basis points) is more than twice as high as that for BBB bonds (181 basis points). This jump
in the spread is likely attributable to not only the increase in the probability of default but also the
lower liquidity of speculative-grade bonds (BB and below) compared with investment-grade bonds.
Panel B summarizes various measures of balance sheet liquidity. To measure liquid asset reserves,
we use the Cash/Assets ratio popular in empirical corporate nance studies, as well as liquidity
ratios employed in empirical default-predicting models. Among the best known models, Altman's
(1968) Z-score includes WC/TA, the ratio of working capital (the dierence between current assets
and current liabilities) to total assets; Zmijewski's (1984) model and the ZETA-score model of
Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) use the current ratio CA/CL (current assets over current
liabilities); and Ohlson (1980) and Chava and Roberts (2004) use both WC/TA and CL/CA to
proxy for liquidity. Davydenko (2010) uses the quick ratio, QA/CL, equal to current assets less
inventories, over current liabilities. The quick ratio is similar to the current ratio, but does not
consider inventories to be part of liquid asset holdings, because distressed rms may nd it dicult
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to convert their inventories into cash. Panel B shows that, our rms have substantially lower
cash reserves on average than those in the broader Compustat samples typically used in empirical
studies of cash holdings. For instance, in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), the mean
(median) ratio of cash to assets is 17% (6.5%), compared with 3.9% (2.0%) in our sample.11
[TABLE 2 HERE]
The potentially ambiguous nature of the spread-cash relationship is illustrated by Figure 4a, which
summarizes cash holdings by credit rating and by the interest coverage ratio. The graph shows that
cash is roughly U-shaped in the rm's credit quality. Safe AAA and AA rms have higher-than-
average cash holdings and low debt levels. Their high balance sheet liquidity and low net leverage
are likely important reasons for why rating agencies rate them so highly in the rst place. For such
rms, the risk of default is unlikely to be a leading factor shaping their cash policy. However, at the
other end of the ratings spectrum, speculative-grade (junk) rms (those rated below BBB{) also
have higher-than-average cash holdings, and lower grades of junk generally correspond to higher
cash reserves. We argue that this pattern is due to levered rms' precautionary motives for saving
cash. Despite their relatively high cash reserves, these rms remain riskier than A- or BBB-rated
rms because of their much higher levels of debt relative to their cash ows. Indeed, even relatively
high cash holdings of 5.8% of net assets for B-rated rms fade to insignicance next to their leverage
ratios, which on average exceed 66%. As a result of these pattern of cash holdings, cash turns out to
be positively associated with spreads in cross-section, with a stronger relationship for riskier rms.
Figure 4b shows a similar U-shaped relationship between cash and the interest coverage ratio,
dened as cash ow over interest payments. Firms with lower coverage ratios face a higher risk of
a cash ow shortage, so that, in contrast to Figure 4a, riskier rms are represented by the left part
of this graph. Our model predicts that equilibrium cash holdings are non-increasing in cash ow.
Figure 4b demonstrates that in the region where credit risk is likely to be a concern (i.e., in the left
part of the graph), cash holdings increase as the cash ow (normalized by debt payments) decreases,
as predicted by the model.
11These dierences arise in part because our sample does not include rms with zero or near-zero leverage, which
tend to hold signicant amounts of cash (Strebulaev and Yang (2006)), and in part because bond issuers are likely
to be less nancially constrained and value cash holdings less than an average Compustat rm (which should work
against our nding of any eects related to the optimally chosen cash policy).
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Fig. 4a. Cash holdings by rating. This graph shows means and medians of the ratio of cash to total
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Fig. 4b. Cash holdings by interest coverage. This graph shows means and medians of the ratio of cash
to total assets by deciles of the interest coverage ratio, computed as EBITDA divided by interest expense.
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3.3. Control variables
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the control variables used in regressions of spreads and
default probabilities, which we borrow from extant empirical research.
Based on insights from structural models of credit risk, empirical studies of spreads control for
leverage, volatility, debt maturity, and various macroeconomic factors, in particularly those related
to the term structure of the risk-free rate of interest (e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin
(2001)). We estimate the (quasi-market) leverage ratio as the book value of total debt divided by
the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity at the end of the previous scal
quarter. Another factor featuring prominently in credit risk models, the volatility of assets, is not
directly observable. We use estimates of rm asset volatility supplied by Moody's/KMV, which
employs a proprietary algorithm based on the Merton (1974) model to infer volatility from the time
series of equity prices. To control for the term premium in corporate bond yields, we use the average
remaining time to maturity of all sample bonds outstanding for the rm at each observation date.
We include the logarithm of total book assets to control for all inuences that the rm's size may
exert on debt spreads. In some of the regressions we also use the rm's senior unsecured credit
ratings by notch from Standard and Poor's (AAA, AA+, AA, AA{, ..., C), which summarizes
the credit agency's opinion of the rm's creditworthiness and incorporates not only its nancial
characteristics but also industry conditions and other, frequently soft, information. Finally, Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) nd that a signicant part of monthly changes in spreads
is driven by unidentied systematic factors. To control for all economy-wide factors, including the
risk-free rate of interest, we use monthly dummies in our regressions of spreads.
Default-predicting models have identied a large number of accounting- and market-based vari-
ables related to default. We re-estimate two of the best-known models, those of Altman (1968)
and Zmijewski (1984), as well as one that uses the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) from
Moody's/KMV. Altman's z-score includes WC/TA (the liquidity proxy), as well as RE/TA (Re-
tained Earnings over Total Assets), EBIT/TA (Earnings Before Interest and Tax over Total Assets),
ME/TL (equity market capitalization over Total Liabilities), and S/TA (Sales over Total Assets).
Zmijewski's model includes the current ratio CA/CL as the liquidity proxy, NI/TA (net income
over Total Assets), and TL/TA (Total Liabilities over Total Assets). Finally, we estimate a simple
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model that uses the quick ratio QA/QL as the liquidity proxy and the EDF from Moody's/KMV
as a summary measure of credit risk. MKMV estimates the EDF based on the rm's equity prices
and liability structure using a version of the Merton (1974) model in conjunction with a proprietary
data set of defaults (Crosbie and Bohn (2002)). Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Bharath and Shumway
(2008) show that variants of this variable are strong predictors of default.
Table 3 shows that our rms are relatively large in size, with median total book assets of almost
$6.5Bn. This is to be expected, given that all of them issue public bonds. They also have relatively
high leverage ratios compared with broad Compustat samples not conditioned on the presence of
public bonds in the capital structure. Statistics on leverage and asset volatility are similar to those
in other credit risk studies. Looking at rm characteristics by rating (not reported), we nd that
rms with higher ratings are larger, less levered, and more protable; have slightly larger capital
expenditures; and return substantially more cash to shareholders via dividends and repurchases
than do riskier rms. Comparing the values of Altman's and Zmijewski's default factors with those
reported in Shumway (2001), our rms appear more distressed than the average Compustat rm {
again, likely because of the presence of bonds, which implies higher-than-average leverage ratios.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
4. Cash holdings and credit spreads
This section studies the relationship between balance sheet liquidity and bond spreads. First, we
show that standard OLS regressions used in empirical studies of spreads appear to suggest that
higher cash holdings result in higher spreads. Then, we use instrumental variables suggested by the
model, and demonstrate that in IV regressions, higher cash holdings correspond to lower spreads.
In these tests, the dependent variable is the bond spread relative to a cash ow-matched portfolio
of Treasuries, averaged across all of the rm's outstanding bonds for each date. To proxy for balance
sheet liquidity, we use the ratio of cash to total assets, as well as working capital over total assets
(as in Altman's (1968) z-score), and the current ratio, equal to current assets over current liabilities
(as in Zmijewski (1984)), although many other proxies yield similar results. We include standard
controls for leverage, volatility, bond maturity, rm size, and credit rating, and also use monthly
dummies to abstract from the eect of all macroeconomic variables.
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The regressions results are presented in Table 4. The eect of standard credit risk factors is in line
with economic intuition and corroborates evidence from other studies of spreads (e.g., Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007)): More levered, more volatile, and smaller rms are riskier and consequently
have higher credit spreads. Adding monthly and rating dummies substantially increases the R2 in
regressions (3) and (4), from 49% to 55% and 68%, even though the regression in column (2) already
controls for credit risk by using leverage and volatility proxies. Thus, though ratings provide an
admittedly crude summary of credit risk (as evidenced by the strong signicance of leverage and
volatility in column (4)), they clearly have signicant incremental explanatory power.
But the results concerning the eect of liquid assets on spreads contradict the simple intuition
that rms with more liquid assets are \safer" and thus should have lower spreads. Both in univariate
regressions and in the presence of standard credit risk controls, the correlation between credit spreads
and liquidity is positive and strongly statistically signicant, typically at the 1% level. The implied
economic eect is also considerable: In columns (1){(3), a one standard deviation increase in the
cash-to-asset ratio corresponds to an increase in the bond spread of about 16 basis points. The
positive relationship between credit spreads and liquidity proxies persists even after controlling
for the credit rating. Moreover, in untabulated tests, we estimate specication (3) separately for
dierent ratings groups, and nd that the coecient for cash is increasing monotonically as the
rating deteriorates (see Figure 1).
These results are robust in the data and insensitive to the way the control variables are con-
structed. They are nearly identical if cash is measured as a fraction of assets net of cash, rather
than total assets, or if, instead of the MKMV asset volatility estimate, we use equity volatility
or the proxy suggested by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008). They are strengthened if we use book
instead of market leverage, or if, instead of monthly dummies, we use macro variables, such as
the risk-free rate (Duee (1998)) or VIX (Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008)). One could hypothesize
that cash holdings are aected by covenants restricting liquidity levels, which in turn are correlated
with the underlying credit risk. However, such covenants are infrequent in practice (Dichev and
Skinner (2002)). Using data on bank loans from DealScan, we nd that only 1.6% of our rms
have covenants specifying minimum liquidity ratios (current or quick ratio). In addition, for 2.9%
of rms covenants restrict capital expenditures, which also may aect cash reserves. Controlling for
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the presence of such covenants has no impact on our results.12
[TABLE 4 HERE]
Our model suggests that the positive correlation of spreads with liquid assets is due to the endoge-
nous nature of cash holdings in credit-risky rms. Thus, standard OLS regressions used in empirical
studies of spreads may be inadequate for studying the role of factors such as cash, which are subject
to endogenous corporate nancing decisions. The model also predicts that exogenous variations in
cash (those not induced by dierences in credit risk factors) should be negatively related to spreads.
We test this prediction using instrumental variable regressions. Instruments are factors that
induce cross-sectional variation in cash holdings unrelated to the underlying credit risk. The model
suggests two potential instruments. First, more protable future investment opportunities (growth
options) should result in the rm's retaining more cash for the future, regardless of its level of credit
risk. Yet once the higher cash reserve is in place, it provides a safety cushion for creditors, decreasing
credit spreads. To proxy for growth options, we use the median ratio of R&D expenditures to sales
in the rm's three-digit SIC industry in each calendar year.13
Second, the model suggests the ratio of managerial private costs of nancial distress to the
fraction of the rm's equity that the manager owns as another instrument. The higher this fraction,
the higher is the manager's incentive to hoard cash (above the level that maximizes the value of
equity) to avoid default and the associated private costs. We assume that the CEO's salary and
bonus are at risk if the rm defaults. Accordingly, our agency term is the ratio of the CEO's salary,
bonus, and other monetary compensation to the market value of her shares and options, estimated
using the ExecuComp database.14
We employ these two instruments in IV of spreads that mirror the regressions of Table 4, with
the same proxies for liquid asset reserves and the same standard control variables. The results are
presented in Table 5. As expected, exogenous variations in liquid asset reserves are negatively and
12The robustness tests are available on request.
13We prefer R&D to the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities, because in addition to other well-
known problems with market-to-book (Erickson and Whited (2000)), in our setting, it is also mechanically correlated
with the market leverage ratio, which renders it unsuitable as a potential instrument. Graham (2000) employs the
ratio of R&D to sales at the level of a rm to proxy growth options. We adopt the industry counterpart to avoid
endogeneity concerns.
14ExecuComp reports the Black-Scholes value of new option grants but not the current value of previously granted
options. We use the algorithm suggested by Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) to estimate the total market value of
the CEO's options.
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signicantly related to bond spreads. Thus, the simple intuition that higher cash holdings make rms
safer, implying a negative relationship between cash and spreads, is correct. However, to uncover
this intuitive result, the empiricist must overturn the eect of endogeneity of cash, which strongly
dominates in standard OLS regressions that are commonly used in empirical studies of credit risk.
These ndings show that accounting for the fact that rms can choose their cash holdings optimally
is of rst-order importance for understanding the role of liquid assets in credit risk.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
5. Balance sheet liquidity and the probability of default
Most empirical default-predicting models include some proxies for balance sheet liquidity, treating
them as independent variables expected to reduce the probability of default. However, despite the
intuitive appeal and the widespread use of liquidity ratios in this context, Begley, Ming, and Watts
(1996), Shumway (2001), and Hillegeist et al. (2004), as well as Ohlson (1980) and Zmijewski (1984)
in their original work, nd them unrelated or even positively associated with default. In this section,
we look at how the endogeneity of cash aects the correlation between liquid asset reserves and the
probability of default.
The standard approach in the literature is to identify a set of factors expected to aect the
probability of default, and, taking them as given, estimate some variant of a hazard model of default
or bankruptcy. Logit models, equivalent to discrete-time hazard models (Shumway (2001)) are used
most frequently. We rst estimate a set of logit regressions of default using dierent model over
the three-year horizon. Using the denition of default adopted by rating agencies, default events
include missed bond payments, bankruptcy lings, and distressed bond renegotiations. (Similar
results obtain when rm failures are restricted to bankruptcies.) The results are presented in
Table 6. Column (1) uses the variables that enter Altman's (1968) z-score model as predictors of
default. While the eect of most variables conforms to expectations, the ratio of working capital to
total assets, which is Altman's proxy for liquidity, is positively correlated with the 3-year default
probability, and is highly statistically signicant. Column (2) employs predictors used by Zmijewski
(1984), and also nds a positive coecient for liquidity, measured by the current ratio. Regression
(3) uses another proxy for liquidity, the quick ratio (Davydenko (2010)), and controls for other credit
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risk factors by including the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) from Moody's/KMV, variations of
which have been frequently used in recent empirical studies (e.g., Bharath and Shumway (2008)).
Once again, liquidity is positively correlated with the probability of default. Columns (4){(6) show
that this basic result persists after the EDF is added to the models of Altman (1968) and Zmijewski
(1984), and even when all the control variables are included simultaneously.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
According to our model, the correlation between liquidity and the probability of default is driven by
the rm's incentive to conserve cash to survive a liquidity shortfall in the short run, which reduces
investment and results in lower expected cash ows in the long run. Thus, we expect the correlation
to be negative over short horizons, but positive over long horizons.
To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate the same predictive models for dierent horizons, one
quarter, one year, and three years. We also use the instrumental variables previously employed in
regressions of spreads (Section 4) to isolate the eect of exogenous increases in cash holdings on
long-term default probabilities. The results of these tests are reported in Table 7.
The regressions in column (1) are for the short-term probability of default, so that the dependent
variable is 1 if the rm defaults within the next scal quarter, and 0 otherwise. As expected, proxies
for balance sheet liquidity are negatively correlated with the short-term probability of default in all
three models. This result is consistent with Davydenko (2010), who nds that rms with restricted
access to external nancing are more likely to default over the next quarter when their liquid assets
fall short of current liabilities.
In contrast to the short-term results, columns (2) and (4) show that liquidity is positively related
to the probability of default at the one and three year horizons, which are typical in empirical default-
predicting studies. This result is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the sign reversal for CA/CL
in the Zmijweski model as the horizon increases from one quarter to one year and beyond.
At the same time, instrumental-variable logit regressions in columns (3) and (5) suggest that the
relationship between cash and the long-term probability of default is negative when the endogeneity
of cash is controlled for, and that it becomes stronger as the prediction horizon increases: The
liquidity coecient is negative but insignicant in 2 of the 3 one-year regressions in column (3), but
it is negative and strongly signicant in all 3 models for the three-year prediction in column (5).
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Overall, these tests suggest that the eect of balance sheet liquidity on the probability of default
for horizons longer than a few months cannot be captured adequately by a standard approach that
treats liquid assets as given. We thus once again emphasize the importance of recognizing that rms
can choose their cash policy endogenously, depending in particular on the rm's credit risk.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we document a robust positive correlation of corporate liquidity with credit spreads
and with the long-term probability of default. This nding runs contrary to the simple intuition
that higher cash reserves make corporate debt safer. We argue that it arises because of endogenous
adjustments in cash holdings by rms that worry about the possibility of a liquidity shortage, which
can trigger costly default in the presence of restrictions on external nancing. Our model shows how
such eects can arise when future cash ows are only partially pledgeable and when default is costly.
At the same time, exogenous variations in the rm's cash holdings that are unrelated to credit risk
factors are negatively correlated with spreads. The simple intuition that predicts that rms with
high cash holdings should be safer can account only for the direct eect of cash on spreads; it misses
the indirect eect due to the endogeneity of cash, which, as our evidence suggests, dominates in
practice. One immediate implication is that recognizing that balance sheet liquidity is endogenous
is important in credit risk studies.
The severe credit crisis caused by the subprime debacle highlights the relation between cash
policy and corporate debt pricing. The subsequent recession implies lower future expected cash
ows. At the same time, the unwillingness of banks to extend credit means that rms cannot rely
on external sources of nancing should a liquidity crisis occur. Both factors increase the value of
a marginal dollar of cash and elevate the importance of cash management policies to a new level.
The perception of market practitioners becomes that \In a period in which credit is being rationed,
the price of leveraged assets declines and cash is king."15 Disentangling the various eects that
such shocks in the economic environment have on cash policy and credit risk provides an important
avenue for further research.
15See \Corporate America sits on its cash," Financial Times, 2008/09/24.
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Appendix A: The rst-order condition and proofs of Propositions
Investment rst-order condition. Managers maximize the value of equity by choosing the appropriate











Substituting the expression for  B from Equation (2) and rearranging, we can rewrite this rst-order condition
as
f0(I) =
1 + (1   )f(I)h( B)
1 + (1   )f(I)h( B)
: (A2)
In the rst-best case of unrestricted investment, the standard maximization solution would yield f0(I) = 1.
In our model, the right-hand side in Equation (A2) is greater than 1 as long as there are nancing frictions (i.e.,
 < 1) and the rm's ability to repay the debt at the chosen investment level is uncertain (i.e., g( B) > 0).
It follows that the rm's optimal investment in our model, I, is lower than the rst-best level.17
To understand the intuition behind the optimal investment and cash policies, note that we can re-write
the rst-order condition as follows:
(f0(I)   1)  (1   G( B))dI = (1   )f(I)  g( B)d B: (A3)
The left-hand side in Equation (A3) is the net value gain from increasing investment by dI, equal to (f0(I) 
1)dI, conditional on survival in the interim period, the probability of which is 1 G( B). The right-hand side
gives shareholders' expected marginal loss from default, equal to the value of equity at the default boundary
(1   )f(I) multiplied by g( B)d B, which is the marginal increase in the probability of default due to the
shift in the default boundary by d B.
Proof of Proposition 1. Dene function m(I;), where I is the optimal investment level from the
rst-order condition (A2), as
m(I;) = f0(I)  
1 + (1   )f(I)h( B)
1 + (1   )f(I)h( B)
: (A4)

















The second-order condition of optimization implies that @m
@I  0. To see it, re-write it as
@m
@I = f00(I)  
(1   )2(f0(I)h( B) + f(I)h0( B)(1   f0(I)))
(1 + (1   )f(I)h( B))2 ; (A6)
which is non-positive because f00 < 0, h0 > 0, and f0(I) < 1
 (the latter holds from the rst-order condition
(A2)). Also,
16It is easy to show that the second-order condition for maximization is satised. We also assume that initial cash
holdings are high enough for the rst-order condition to yield an interior solution, i.e. c0 > I
.
17The economic mechanism that generates this under-investment is very dierent from that in the standard debt
overhang problem in Myers (1977), which, in contrast to our assumptions, essentially requires debt to be long term
and investment to be short term. One of the solutions suggested to the debt overhang problem is to use debt of shorter
maturity. In our case, however, it may only worsen the outcome.




(1   )2f(I)h0( B)
@ B
@
(1 + (1   )f(I)h( B))2 > 0; (A7)
because
@ B
@ =  1. Therefore, @c

@  0.

















































@  0, for this quantity to be negative, it is sucient to establish that @c
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The right-hand of this equation is greater than  1 if and only if
Z()  f00(I)   f0(I)(1   f0(I))
2 (h( B)   f(I)h0( B)) < 0: (A12)
Note that when  = 0,
Z(0) = f00(I)   f0(I)h( B) < 0: (A13)
Because Z() is continuous in , there exist such   > 0 that for all  <  , the condition (A12) is satised. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Because @s






















Since f0(I) < 1
 , @s
@c < 0. Therefore, the sign of ds
dx is the opposite of the sign of @c
@x. 2
Proof of Proposition 3 is provided in the main text. 2
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Appendix B: Growth options and managerial losses
For simplicity, in our discussion in this subsection, we will assume that no part of time 2 cash ow is pledgeable
at t = 1, so that  = 0.
Proposition B1. The equilibrium level of cash holdings c is positively related to the growth option z.
Credit spread s is negatively related to the growth option z only through the change in optimal cash balance.
Proof of Proposition B1. With growth option z, the rst-order condition that determines the rm's
investment policy takes the following form:
f0(I) =
1 + [(1   )f(I) + z]h( B)
1 +  [(1   )f(I) + z]h( B)
: (B1)
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, dene m(I;z) as
m(I;z) = f0(I)  
1 + [(1   )f(I) + z]h( B)
1 +  [(1   )f(I) + z]h( B)
:
It is easy to show (as in Proposition 1) that the second-order condition implies @m





(1 +  [(1   )f(I) + z]h( B))2h2( B)(1   ) < 0; (B2)
and therefore, @c
@z > 0. The result on credit spread follows because @s
@z = 0 by assumption, and @s
@c < 0 (for
the reasons established in (A8)). 2
Proposition B2. The equilibrium level of cash holdings c is positively related to the agency parameter

. Credit spread s is negatively related to the agency parameter

 only through the change in optimal cash
balance.














which results in a condition identical to (B1), with z replaced by

. The result then follows from applying
the proof of Proposition B1.2
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Table 1
Sample size and industry composition
This table shows the number of unique rms, as well as spreads (bond-months), rm-
months, and rm-quarters in the sample, by rating and by broad industry group. For
rms whose rating changes during the sample period, the `Firms' column of Panel A
reports the senior unsecured rating as of the rst date the rm appears in the data set.
For other columns, ratings are as of the observation date. The bond sample consists of
straight xed-coupon bonds without embedded optionalities, with remaining maturity
between one and thirty years, issued by non-nancial U.S. rms and included in the
Merrill Lynch U.S. Investment Grade Index or High Yield Master II Index between
December 1996 and December 2003.
Firms Spreads Firm-months Firm-quarters
Panel A: Observations by rating
AAA 7 1,224 447 155
AA 38 6,090 1,622 559
A 164 30,627 8,075 2,780
BBB 191 33,281 10,420 3,600
BB 60 8,364 2,842 1,007
B 24 2,444 942 343
CCC and below 1 646 148 60
Panel B: Observations by industry
Consumer goods 66 14,167 3,686 1,284
Manufacturing 92 12,505 4,515 1,565
High Tech & Telecoms 49 8,884 2,347 819
Wholesale and retail trade 61 12,478 3,521 1,218
Oil & Chemicals 56 9,324 3,220 1,108
Utilities & Transportation 80 14,439 3,942 1,368
Other industries 81 10,879 3,265 1,142
Total 485 82,676 24,496 8,504
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Table 2
Statistics on spreads and liquidity ratios
This table reports summary statistics on credit spreads and measures of balance
sheet liquidity, by rm-month observation. Panel A reports the annualized bond
spread in basis points, averaged over all outstanding straight bonds for each rm-
month, for all rms and separately by senior unsecured rating. The benchmark
risk-free yield is the yield on a cash ow-matched portfolio of STRIPS. STRIPS
yields are observed as of the observation date and are linearly approximated for
dates between the maturity dates of two STRIPS. Panel B reports liquidity ratios
for the sample of rm-months, as of the end of the previous scal quarter. TA is the
total book assets of the issuing rm. Cash is cash and marketable securities; WC is
working capital, CA is current assets, QA is current assets less inventories, and CL
is current liabilities.
Mean Median 25% 75% St. dev. N
Panel A: Credit spreads
All 191.5 135.2 87.5 214.8 178.4 24,496
AAA 80.0 74.2 57.7 95.8 26.8 447
AA 78.7 69.3 54.0 94.0 36.3 1,622
A 114.9 100.7 72.9 142.3 60.0 8,075
BBB 180.5 152.5 104.0 210.3 119.5 10,420
BB 371.7 321.7 220.7 452.5 227.1 2,842
B 583.8 512.6 349.5 759.6 287.2 942
CCC and below 757.6 740.8 470.0 1,139.6 322.4 148
Panel B: Liquidity ratios
Cash/TA 0.039 0.020 0.009 0.048 0.049 24,258
WC/TA 0.073 0.056 -0.012 0.146 0.123 22,741
CA/CL (current ratio) 1.342 1.252 0.935 1.637 0.579 22,741
QA/CL (quick ratio) 0.745 0.687 0.497 0.925 0.383 22,424
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Table 3
Statistics on control variables
This table reports summary statistics on control variables used in regressions
of spreads and default. Total assets is the total book assets of the issuing rm
in billions of dollars. Cash/Assets is cash and near-cash divided by total book
assets. Cash/Net assets is cash and near-cash divided by total book assets
minus cash. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided by the sum of
the book value of debt and the market value of equity. Asset volatility is the
annualized standard deviation of asset returns estimated by Moody's/KMV.
Bond maturity is the remaining bond maturity in years on the observation date
averaged over all bonds with available spreads for each rm-month observation
in the sample. TA is the book value of total assets, RE is retained earnings,
ME is the market value of equity, TL is the book value of total liabilities, S is
sales, NI is net income, and EDF is the Expected Default Frequency provided
by Moody's/KMV.
Mean Median 25% 75% St. dev. N
Total assets, $Bn 13.37 6.46 2.95 16.47 20.04 24,315
Leverage 0.325 0.298 0.164 0.461 0.196 23,021
Asset volatility 0.187 0.179 0.146 0.217 0.060 21,962
Bond maturity 8.979 7.250 4.549 12.145 6.009 24,496
RE/TA 0.218 0.207 0.084 0.345 0.227 22,738
EBIT/TA 0.023 0.022 0.012 0.034 0.022 21,473
ME/TL 1.796 1.161 0.629 2.198 1.917 23,770
S/TA 0.256 0.218 0.137 0.314 0.180 24,252
NI/TA 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.019 0.018 24,258
TL/TA 0.682 0.671 0.592 0.760 0.139 24,294
EDF, % 0.712 0.200 0.069 0.578 1.661 21,962
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Table 4
OLS regressions of bond spreads
The dependent variable is the annualized yield spread in basis points relative to a cash ow-matched
portfolio of STRIPS, averaged over all outstanding bonds for each rm-month observation in the sample.
TA is the book value of total assets, WC is working capital, CA is current assets, and CL is current
liabilities. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and
the market value of equity. Asset volatility is the volatility of assets as estimated by Moody's/KMV.
Maturity is the weighted-average remaining bond maturity in years for all bonds with available spreads
for each rm-month observation in the sample. The values of t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the
rm level are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, **, and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% signicance levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cash/TA 3.26*** 3.12*** 3.25*** 1.25*




(current ratio) (2.67) (2.71)
Leverage 6.45*** 5.72*** 2.92*** 3.04*** 3.02***
(18.6) (16.1) (9.63) (9.52) (9.45)
Asset volatility 12.5*** 9.19*** 4.06*** 3.97*** 4.12***
(14.3) (9.09) (5.53) (5.50) (5.68)
Log(TA) -0.12*** -0.25*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.13***
(-3.22) (-5.88) (-4.55) (-3.60) (-3.68)
Maturity 0.0021 0.0048 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.35) (0.80) (3.60) (3.45) (3.35)
Rating dummies Yes Yes Yes
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Const. 1.79*** -1.59*** -0.16 0.30 1.84*** 0.075 1.59*** -0.0035
(27.5) (-3.72) (-0.33) (0.71) (27.7) (0.17) (12.0) (-0.0077)
N 24,258 21,110 21,110 21,110 22,741 20,178 22,741 20,178
Adj. R2 0.8% 49.2% 54.8% 67.7% 0.4% 68.5% 0.6% 68.4%
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Table 5
Instrumental variable regressions of credit spreads
The dependent variable is the annualized yield spread in basis points relative to a cash ow-matched
portfolio of STRIPS, averaged over all outstanding bonds for each rm-month observation in the sample.
The proxies for balance sheet liquidity (Cash/TA, WC/TA, and CA/CL) are instrumented with the
R&D/Sales ratio of the median rm in the same three-digit SIC industry each year and with the Agency
term, dened as the ratio of the CEO's salary and bonus to the value of her equity holdings and options
in the rm. TA is the book value of total assets, WC is working capital, CA is current assets, and CL is
current liabilities. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt
and the market value of equity. Asset volatility is the volatility of assets as estimated by Moody's/KMV.
Maturity is the weighted-average remaining bond maturity in years for all bonds with available spreads
for each rm-month observation in the sample. The values of t-statistics adjusted for clustering at the
rm level are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, **, and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% signicance levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cash/TA -6.46*** -4.42** -2.64* -4.57***




(current ratio) (-2.39) (-1.71)
Leverage 5.84*** 4.98*** 2.71*** 2.79*** 2.93***
(14.2) (12.1) (8.06) (6.01) (5.96)
Asset volatility 13.8*** 9.40*** 5.85*** 7.75*** 8.37***
(12.1) (7.51) (6.00) (4.26) (3.28)
Log(TA) -0.072* -0.21*** -0.12*** -0.26*** -0.31***
(-1.89) (-4.93) (-3.52) (-3.61) (-2.85)
Maturity 0.0076 0.011* 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.025***
(1.19) (1.79) (3.81) (2.88) (2.82)
Rating dummies Yes Yes Yes
Monthly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Const. 1.96*** -1.91*** -0.12 0.39 2.15*** 1.45* 3.49*** 2.95*
(19.2) (-4.46) (-0.24) (0.92) (11.9) (1.88) (4.65) (1.79)
N 17,703 16,497 16,497 16,497 16,839 15,864 16,839 15,864
Adj. R2 .% 41.6% 50.3% 63.5% .% 53.3% .% 49.3%
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Table 6
Liquid assets in long-term default-predicting models
This table reports quarterly logit regressions of public bond defaults over the 3-year horizon.
The dependent variable equals 1 if the rm defaults within 3 years from the observation date,
and 0 otherwise. WC is working capital, TA is the book value of total assets, CA is current
assets, CL is current liabilities, QA is current assets less inventories, RE is retained earnings,
ME is the market value of equity, TL is the book value of total liabilities, S is sales, NI is net
income, and EDF is the Expected Default Frequency provided by Moody's/KMV. Absolute
values of z-statistics adjusted for clustering at the rm level are reported in parentheses.
Coecients marked ***, **, and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance levels,
respectively.




(current ratio) (4.81) (5.39)
QA/CL 0.10** 0.09**
(quick ratio) (2.17) (2.07)
RE/TA -1.32*** 0.16 0.30 0.13
(5.63) (0.39) (0.73) (0.33)
EBIT/TA -14.74*** -13.53*** -14.48*** -13.66***
(11.12) (4.55) (4.73) (4.63)
ME/TL -0.56*** -0.10 -0.13 -0.09
(3.00) (1.05) (1.38) (0.90)
S/TA -0.98 -1.12 -0.54 -0.41
(1.63) (1.43) (0.75) (0.58)
NI/TA -16.03*** 0.19 1.44 0.78
(13.30) (0.07) (0.51) (0.29)
TL/TA 2.42*** 1.20* 1.50** 0.82
(7.07) (1.77) (2.23) (1.20)
EDF 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15***
(20.04) (12.08) (11.83) (12.25)
const. -1.80*** -5.00*** -3.52*** -3.83*** -4.65*** -3.63***
(9.14) (15.68) (28.65) (7.29) (8.13) (6.98)
N 17,925 21,625 16,944 14,966 14,965 14,777
R2 15.9% 13.3% 24.0% 26.5% 27.5% 26.4%
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Liquid assets and the probability of default at dierent horizons
This table reports quarterly logit regressions (columns (1), (2), and (4)) and instrumental-
variable logit regressions (columns (3) and (5)) of public bond defaults at dierent prediction
horizons. In regression (1), the dependent variable equals 1 if the rm defaults within the
following scal quarter, and 0 otherwise. In regressions (3) and (4), the dependent variable
equals 1 if the rm defaults between 9 to 12 months from the observation date, and 0 otherwise.
In regressions (5) and (6), the dependent variable equals 1 if the rm defaults between 33 to
36 months from the observation date, and 0 otherwise. WC is working capital, TA is the book
value of total assets, CA is current assets, CL is current liabilities, QA is current assets less
inventories, RE is retained earnings, ME is the market value of equity, TL is the book value
of total liabilities, S is sales, NI is net income, and EDF is the Expected Default Frequency
provided by Moody's/KMV. Absolute values of z-statistics adjusted for clustering at the rm
level are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, **, and * are signicant at the 1%,
5%, and 10% signicance levels, respectively.
1 quarter 1 year 3 years
Logit Logit IV Logit IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Altman's (1968) z-score
WC/TA -1.05*** 2.28*** 1.82 2.92*** -73.09***
(2.62) (4.24) (0.35) (3.70) (3.40)
RE/TA -0.16 -0.79*** -0.92* -0.82*** 2.48
(0.96) (3.14) (1.74) (3.40) (1.41)
EBIT/TA -0.83 -11.50*** -9.50** -5.07** -40.07***
(1.23) (6.59) (2.18) (2.09) (2.76)
ME/TL -11.08*** -0.92** -1.59** -0.29 -0.10
(10.28) (2.36) (2.04) (1.55) (0.13)
S/TA 0.28 -1.53** -1.00 -1.09 16.48***
(0.58) (2.33) (0.72) (1.21) (3.07)
const. -1.94*** -4.00*** -3.58*** -5.01*** -3.81***
(9.78) (13.60) (6.09) (19.18) (5.10)
N 17,922 17,922 8,363 17,922 8,363
Zmijewski's (1984) model
CA/CL -0.35** 0.27*** -1.53 0.42*** -11.45***
(current ratio) (2.46) (4.09) (1.05) (4.91) (3.83)
NI/TA -18.10*** -11.99*** -16.96*** -5.20*** -26.70***
(12.36) (9.48) (4.28) (2.77) (2.89)
TL/TA 2.77*** 1.87*** 0.32 1.90*** -14.61***
(7.22) (5.64) (0.14) (4.98) (2.78)
const. -7.12*** -6.91*** -3.38 -7.60*** 20.77***
(18.70) (23.27) (0.93) (20.52) (2.66)
N 21,625 21,625 9,826 21,625 9,826
EDF-based model
QA/CL -0.73*** 0.26*** -0.82 0.43*** -5.72***
(quick ratio) (2.75) (2.89) (0.58) (4.06) (3.41)
EDF 0.31*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.07*** 0.13***
(12.58) (17.25) (11.19) (5.00) (3.69)
const. -7.57*** -6.21*** -5.54*** -6.11*** -1.31
(14.21) (35.11) (4.60) (31.55) (0.94)
N 16,944 16,944 9,139 16,944 9,139